Hanjo Hamann / Fachtexte

Publikationen

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9 … Property, Psyche, and the Theory of Tenancy. Independent and Interdependent Lease Law Covenants Through the Lens of Cultural Psychology
J. Prop. Law 9 (2023), S. 223–262 … DOI: 10.37419/JPL.V9.I2.1

8 … K Is for Contract―Why Is It, Though? A K’s Study on the Origins, Persistence and Propagation of Legal Konventions
MLR Headnotes 106 (2022), S. 362–390

7 … Seven Years of Language & Law. Editors’ Progress Report on the Journal of the International Language & Law Association
JLL 8 (2019), S. 1–8, gemeinsam mit Friedemann Vogel … DOI: 10.14762/jll.2019.001

6 … Computer-Assisted Legal Linguistics. Corpus Analysis as a New Tool for Legal Studies
Law & Soc. Inq. 43 (2018), S. 1340–1363, gemeinsam mit Friedemann Vogel / Isabelle Gauer … DOI: 10.1111/lsi.12305

5 … 70 Jahre Marginalien des deutschen Staatsrechts. Nachschau auf ein vergessenes Kapitel der Nachkriegspublizistik
AöR 143 (2018), S. 282–311 … DOI: 10.1628/aoer-2018-0022

4 … Evidence-Based Jurisprudence meets Legal Linguistics. Unlikely Blends Made in Germany
BYU L. Rev. 43 (2018), S. 1473–1501, gemeinsam mit Friedemann Vogel … ISSN: 0360-151X

3 … The Fabric of Language and Law. Towards an International Research Network for Computer Assisted Legal Linguistics (CAL²)
JLL 6 (2017), S. 101–109, gemeinsam mit Friedemann Vogel … DOI: 10.14762/jll.2017.101

2 … Cui Bono, Benefit Corporation? An Experiment Inspired by Social Enterprise Legislation in Germany and the US
RLE 11 (2015), S. 79–110, gemeinsam mit Sven Fischer / Sebastian J. Goerg … DOI: 10.1515/rle-2014-0036 How do barely incentivized norms impact incentive-rich environments? We take social enterprise legislation as a case in point. It establishes rules on behalf of constituencies that have no institutionalized means of enforcing them. By relying primarily on managers' other-regarding concerns whilst leaving corporate incentive structures unaltered, how effective can such legislation be? This question is vital for the ongoing debate about social enterprise forms, as recently introduced in several US states and in British Columbia, Canada. We ran a laboratory experiment with a framing likened to German corporate law which traditionally includes social standards. Our results show that a stakeholder provision, as found in both Germany and the US, cannot overcome material incentives. However, even absent incentives the stakeholder norm does not foster other regarding behavior but slightly inhibits it instead. Our experiment thus illustrates the paramount importance of taking into account both incentives and framing effects when designing institutions. We tentatively discuss potential policy implications for social enterprise legislation and the stakeholder debate.

1 … Unpacking the Board. A Comparative and Empirical Perspective on Groups in Corporate Decision-Making
BBLJ 11 (2014), S. 1–54 … DOI: 10.15779/Z38GC6H